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NEW MEXICO V MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE:
WHEN CAN A STATE CONCURRENTLY REGULATE
HUNTING AND FISHING BY NONMEMBERS* ON
RESERVATION LAND
STEPHEN E. WOODBURY**
I. INTRODUCTION
Native Americans on reservations traditionally have struggled with
economic plight.' One way tribes recently have attempted to generate
income is to create hunting and fishing preserves on reservation land.
These preserves attract nonmembers who pay license fees to the tribe and
who support Indian-owned businesses on the reservation.' States almost
universally have responded to hunting and fishing on tribal lands by
requiring nonmembers to purchase state licenses as a prerequisite to uti-
lizing reservation resources. The purpose of the state license requirement
is to generate income for the state treasury. Additionally, states have
enforced more restrictive bag limits and hunting seasons in order to
conserve the amount of fish and game within the state.' This dual regulation4
*Although the term "non-Indian" frequently is used in cases of state regulation of reservation
land, what is meant is nonmembers of the tribe whose reservation is being regulated. Members of
tribes often visit reservations other than their own. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico,
630 F.2d 724, 726 n.I (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), affd, 677 F.2d 55 (10th
Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
**B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University of Michigan; member, New Mexico State Bar.
1. See Newsweek, Nov. 29, 1982, at 49, which stated: "Since 1980, average unemployment on
the reservations has jumped from an already devastating 40 percent to fully 80 percent. And in some
tribes, average income for a family of four has fallen to a paltry $900 a year"; Note, Balancing the
Interests in Taxation of Non-Indian Activities on Indian Land, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1459 (1979) (reporting
that in 1978 the average income of a reservation family was $4,000, with unemployment as high
as 40% on some reservations). The problem is particularly severe today because of the recent cuts
in federal social programs. See, e.g., Address by John E. Echohawk, Executive Director, Native
American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colorado, University of Michigian Indian Law Day (April 8, 1983)
(explaining the current federal policy as "termination by lack of appropriation; 'Reaganomics' doesn't
work on reservations because there is no private sector to pick up the slack.")
2. In one case, the tribal revenue garnered from license fees, campground permits, and a resort
complex was approximately $270,000 in both 1976 and 1977. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 n.4 (1983).
3. See, e.g., White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129, 1137 n.8 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 489 (1982). (Minnesota has a nine day deer season, while the band
has a six and one-half week season. The state prohibits the killing of antlerless deer, while the band
has a limit of 150.) In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), the
court noted state conservation concems:"The State suggests that, whatever the justification for
exclusive tribal regulation under a traditional analysis, the seriousness of ecological problems creates
an implied exception in this case." Id. at 734.
4. The phrase "dual regulation," as used in this article, refers to the state and tribe both attempting
to regulate the hunting and fishing activities of nonmembers on the reservation.
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impedes the incentive for nonmembers to hunt and fish on reservations
and causes tribes to lose valuable income.5
Tribes have sought to invalidate state regulation on grounds of federal
preemption and interference with traditional tribal sovereignty. These
efforts have produced mixed results.6 This outcome has been caused
partially by the factual differences among the cases; however, it is largely
the result of a disagreement among the courts over which legal principles
to apply to state regulation of nonmembers' activities on reservation land.
Specifically, the disagreement has arisen over the following issues: how
explicit congressional intent must be to establish preemption; what em-
phasis should be given to a tribe's interest in controlling activities on the
reservation, especially when those activities generate needed tribal in-
come; and, what weight should be given to state revenue and conservation
interests.
On June 13, 1983, the United States Supreme Court announced its
position on dual regulation in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.7
The Court held that New Mexico was preempted from regulating the
Mescalero's commercial fish and game program. The Court reached this
conclusion by examining the competing tribal, federal, and state interests
at stake, rather than narrowly focusing on an express congressional intent
to preempt state regulation. 8 Using this approach, the Court first found
the tribe had an historic interest in controlling the wildlife resources on
the reservation, an interest which federal treaties and statutes confirmed. 9
The Court also held the state's more restrictive regulation of bag limits
5. See, e.g. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980). The court found that the
imposition of a $5.50 state fishing license fee on nonmembers who also paid a $2.00 per day tribal
license fee was a "substantial deterrent" to prospective visitors; the state license fee also prevented
the tribe from increasing its own fee. Id.
6. Those courts upholding dual regulation include: White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 489 (1982); United States v. Montana,
604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Those courts finding
state regulation invalid include: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir.
1981) (in this consolidated case, the court affirmed the granting of a preliminary injunction against
Washington to enforce its regulations on the Colville Indian reservation, while the court vacated and
remanded the lower court's decision allowing Arizona to enforce its own regulations on the White
Mountain Apache Reservation with the suggestion that White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980), be applied); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th
Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), aff d, 677 F.2d 55 (1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2378
(1983); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d
75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
8. Id. at 2386.
9. Id. at 2387-88. The Court reached this conclusion by construing the Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976), 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)
and hereinafter referred to as Public Law 280); the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1981); and
18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976).
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and hunting seasons would interfere with the tribe's ability to conduct a
carefully planned wildlife management program designed to curb exces-
sive population growth. ' Addressing the federal interests, the Court found
an intent to preempt New Mexico when the federal government heavily
financed and managed the tribal program." The Court also identified the
existence of a federal statute which arguably excludes states from regu-
lating tribal resources. 2 Moreover, the Court stated Congress' objective
of encouraging tribal independence and economic development would be
thwarted by concurrent regulation. ' Finally, the Court held the state had
no conservation interest justifying the assertion of more restrictive bag
limits and hunting seasons because most fish and game do not migrate
off the reservation, and the few animals that do migrate are not in scarce
supply in the state.' 4 The Court also noted New Mexico had not signif-
icantly contributed to the development or maintenance of the tribe's pro-
gram. 5 Furthermore, the Court found the following: the loss of license
revenue to the state would be insubstantial; the license fee would not be
returned to the nonmember taxpayer in the form of state services; and,
the revenue interest was insufficient to justify state regulation of reser-
vation activities. 16
New Mexico Attorney General Paul Bardacke responded to the Su-
preme Court's decision by stating that New Mexico is preempted only
from regulating the Mescalero reservation because the opinion empha-
sized that a different result would ensue if the facts were different. 1'
Bardacke's comment would find support in the Ninth and Eighth Circuits
where the courts approved dual regulation in cases with sharply different
facts from the Mescalero decision. 8 Some factors these courts considered
included the following: whether there is little, or no, federal assistance
to the tribe's program; whether the tribe receives an insubstantial amount
of revenue from its program; whether the tribe's revenue interest would
not be significantly affected by state regulation; whether the tribe has no
10. 103 S. Ct. at 2388-89 (1983).
11. Id. at 2389.
12. Id. at 2389 n.25.
13. Id. at 2390.
14. Id. at 2390-91.
15. Id. at 2390.
16. Id. at 2390-91.
17. Bardacke stated, "We don't know how the next case will be decided based on this case....
This case is precedent for nothing other than the holding in this particular factual setting." Albu-
querque Journal, June 14, 1983, at A-6, col. I.
18. See White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 527 (D.Minn. 1981),
aff'd, 83 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 489 (1982), and infra notes 102-10
and accompanying text; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 544
(1981), and infra notes 27-31, 66-83 and accompanying text.
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carefully conceived wildlife management program; whether the state gives
substantial assistance to the tribal preserve; and, most importantly, whether
the state has a legitimate interest in conservation.
This article agrees with Bardacke and sets forth a comprehensive stan-
dard which courts, attorneys general, and tribal counsel should follow in
deciding whether the state is preempted from regulating a particular res-
ervation. First, the article explains why the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,
the first courts that tried to resolve the question of concurrent regulation
of hunting and fishing on tribal lands, reached opposite results. Second,
this article examines two conflicting 1980 Supreme Court decisions on
the general issue of state regulation of nonmember activities on reservation
land. Both decisions had a significant influence on the Ninth and Tenth
(Mescalero I) Circuits, which announced different methods for analyzing
the question of state regulation of hunting and fishing on tribal lands.
Third, this article demonstrates how other recent conflicting Supreme
Court decisions motivated the Eighth and Tenth (Mescalero II) Circuits
to reach differing results. Finally, this article assesses the conflicting
circuit decisions, as well as the Supreme Court's decision (Mescalero
III), and defines the standard of analysis practitioners and judges should
use to resolve dual regulation cases. This standard essentially asserts that
state regulation is invalid absent a strong state interest in conservation.
II. EARLY CASE LAW: AN ILLUSTRATION OF CONTROVERSY
The first two courts to decide the question of whether a state could
restrict a tribe's regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing on the
reservation reached opposite results. A discussion of these opinions is
useful because many of the conflicting legal principles and factual patterns
identified by these courts were used by other courts to uphold or strike
down state regulation.
The Fourth Circuit prohibited state regulation of nonmember fishing
in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Commission. 9 The court held that North Carolina could not require non-
members to purchase a state fishing license, in addition to the fishing
permit required by the Indian band, as a prerequisite to trout fishing on
the Cherokee reservation. The court based this decision on the independent
grounds of preemption and frustration of tribal self-government.
In its preemption analysis, the court found the Department of Interior,
a federal agency, regularly supplied fish and personnel to stock reservation
streams.2° This activity is consistent with the federal trust obligation of
19. 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
20. Id. at 77-78. The Department of Interior supplied 200,000 fish per year immediately preceding
the lawsuit. Id. at 77.
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assisting Indian tribes." On the other hand, North Carolina rendered no
assistance and had no interest in conserving fish spawn for commercial
purposes, especially when those fish did not migrate off the reservation.22
Therefore, the court concluded that the federal involvement, which fur-
thered a general federal policy of assisting tribes, was sufficient to preempt
the state,23 even though the federal agency acted under no statute expressly
authorizing support of tribal commercial wildlife programs.24
The court in Eastern Band also found that requiring nonmembers to
purchase a state license would frustrate the band's ability to manage its
own affairs because the band would lose "substantial economic benefits,"
which contribute to its attempt to achieve "financial self-sufficiency. '"25
The additional fee would deter many prospective fishermen from pur-
chasing band permits, and Indian-owned shops and restaurants would be
deprived of income from nonmembers.26
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit upheld Montana's
regulation of nonmember fishing and hunting on the Crow reservation
in United States v. Montana.27 The state not only was allowed to require
prospective sportsmen to purchase state licenses, but it also was permitted
to impose more restrictive regulations than those of the tribe on bag limits
and hunting seasons. The court reached this conclusion by rejecting
preemption and tribal self-government arguments.
The Ninth Circuit held that the state was not preempted because there
was no "'clear manifestation' of a congressional intent to preempt" in
any statute or by delegated authority, given by Congress to tribes under
the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act,2" to adopt laws pertaining to res-
ervation activity.29 On the other hand, the state possessed a "great interest"
in preserving the migratory game, which pass over reservation boundaries
21. Id. at 78.
22. Id. at 78-79.
23. Id. at 78.
24. The court in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians pointed to two statutes, 16 U.S.C. § 661
(1976) and 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) as supporting federal agency participation. Id. at 78 n.2. 16
U.S.C. § 661 (1976) concerns the protection and conservation of wildlife, and authorizes the De-
partment of Interior to assist federal agencies in stocking. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) allows the BIA to
expend funds under the supervision of the Department of Interior for a variety of general purposes,
none of which mentions wildlife stocking or economic development.
25. 588 F.2d at 78-79 (4th Cir. 1978).
26. Id. at 77-78.
27. 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The Supreme
Court's ruling did not disturb the Ninth Circuit's holding because the Supreme Court made a threshold
determination that the land being regulated was owned by nonmembers, not the tribe. See United
States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1980).
28. 25 U.S.C. §§461-92 (1976).
29. Montana, 604 F.2d at 1172. See also United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Sanford court found a federal trespass statute was not "an attempt by Congress to enter the
field of fish and game regulation." Id. at 1089 (quoting State v. Danielson, 427 P.2d 689, 691 (Mont.
1967)).
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and would be protected by the state's more restrictive bag limits and
hunting seasons.3
The court also found the tribe's authority to govern would not be
impeded because the state was not trying to authorize nonmember activity
on the reservation that is prohibited by the tribe. 3' Rather, the state's
regulations were more restrictive than tribal rules. The court ignored the
issue of whether the more restrictive state laws would hurt the tribe
financially.
Both the Eastern Band and Montana courts focused on the effect state
regulation would have on furthering the competing interests of federal,
state, and tribal governments. Yet, there were several important differ-
ences between the two opinions. First, the Eastern Band court found
preemption by determining that a federal agency's tribal assistance con-
stituted sufficient implied authority from Congress to preempt the state.
The Montana court, however, rejected an implied authority standard by
requiring an express congressional intent to preempt state regulation.
Second, the cases differed factually because a state conservation interest
was present in Montana, but not in Eastern Band. Third, the Eastern
Band court considered a reduction of tribal revenue paramount in deter-
mining whether state action interferes with tribal self-government. The
Montana court, however, ignored a tribal revenue interest and only ex-
amined whether the tribe's authority to make laws had been obstructed.
These different legal and factual bases provided the groundwork for
later courts to reach contrasting results. Moreover, the Supreme Court is
divided on these and other related issues.
III. INTERLUDE: CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM THE
SUPREME COURT
In 1980, the Supreme Court rendered two important decisions on the
general power of a state to regulate nonmember activity on reservation
land. An examination of these somewhat conflicting opinions is necessary
because every court subsequently adjudicating the question of state power
to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on reservations relies heavily
on these decisions.
The Court discussed extensively the issue of state power to regulate
nonmember activity on reservation land in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville.32 The Court held Washington could impose cigarette
excise and retail sales taxes upon Indian retailers for cigarette sales to
30. Montana at 1172 n. 15. The court used this conservation interest to distinquish Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians. Id.
31. Id. at 1171 (quoting Confederated Tribes of Colville v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89, 92 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
32. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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nonmembers on the reservation. The Court made this decision acknowl-
edging that the state taxes "seriously disadvantage[d] or eliminate[d] the
Indian retailer's business... "3 because nonmembers came to the res-
ervation only to purchase untaxed cigarettes.34 The destruction of the
tribal business would make poor tribes even poorer. 3" The Court reached
this seemingly harsh decision by rejecting the tribe's preemption and
tribal self-government arguments.
In the preemption inquiry, the Colville Court first examined federal
statutes including the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the Indian
Financing Act of 1974.36 The Court determined that these statutes only
evidenced a general congressional concern for "fostering tribal self-gov-
ernment and economic development .... ," but did not express a desire
to give tribes "an artifical competitive advantage over all other business
in a State."37 The Court also interpreted the Washington Enabling Act,38
the statute that admitted the state to the union, to be designed in part to
prevent state taxation of income generated from reservation land.3" In this
instance, however, the Court found the state cigarette taxes were imposed
upon the sale of imported cigarettes, which obviously have "no substantial
connection" to reservation realty. 4' In addition, the tax was paid by non-
members.' The Court observed that although the tribe was empowered
to enact federally approved Indian taxing ordinances under the Indian
33. Id. at 151.
34. The Court stated, "All parties agree that if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops
and eliminate that $1 saving, the stream of non-Indian bargain hunters would dry up." Id. at 145.
35. The district court found the Colville reservation isolated and underdeveloped, with two tribes
"plagued by unemployment of 33 percent and 60 percent." Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (E.D. Wash. 1978). The Supreme Court found
that the loss of cigarette revenue would make the Colville Indians even poorer. In 1975, the Yakima
Tribe got $278,000 from its cigarette business. Tribal taxes produced the following revenue between
1972 and 1976: Colville: $266,000; Lummi: $54,000; and, Makah: $13,000. Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1980). See also Chen,
WhatAbout Colville?, 8 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 161,168, 170-71 (1980) (statistically showing the economic
impact of the loss of cigarette sales on each tribe).
36. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is contained in 25 U.S.C. §§461-92 (1976). The
policy underlying the act is to "rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to
develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism." Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 6
(1934)). The Indian Financing Act of 1974 is contained in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1976). The
purpose of this Act is "to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a
point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their
own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts
comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities." Id. at § 1451. Both purposes
were recognized by the Supreme Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378,
2386 n.17 (1983).
37. 447 U.S. at 155.
38. 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
39. 447 U.S. at 156.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Reorganization Act of 1934, this authority could not be construed as
evidence of congressional intent to preempt otherwise valid state taxes
imposed upon nonmembers.42
The Colville Court also found there would be no interference with tribal
self-government by a reduction in revenue to the tribe from the loss of
cigarette sales. 43 The Court reached this conclusion by applying the fol-
lowing test:
While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for essential
governmental programs, that interest is strongest when the revenues
are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities
involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal
services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest in
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the
recipient of state services."
In this case, the cigarettes were not made on the reservation, but were
imported onto the reservation for sale. Furthermore, the nonmember cig-
arette purchaser received no Indian services, like schooling or fire pro-
tection. On the other hand, the nonmember purchaser received a variety
of state services and the cigarettes were produced off the reservation.45
This analysis suggests a court is more inclined to approve state taxation
when a tribe is not engaged in management of its own resources.
The Colville opinion enunciates principles which often would support
state regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing on reservations. In
the preemption inquiry, the court indicated that only a federal statute
which came close to expressly preempting state regulation would suffice.
Therefore, the statutes which arguably gave the federal agencies in East-
ern Band the implied authority to assist the tribes would not be enough
to preempt the state because they do not relate to giving aid to a tribe's
commercial hunting and fishing program. 46 The Montana court took a
better approach by searching for a statute that directly preempts state
regulation."
Assuming no federal preemption is found, the Colville opinion asks
courts to balance the competing tribal and state interests according to its
express formula. The tribe usually would have a revenue interest in
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 156-57.
45. The Court stated, "Washington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the Tribes from
marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant tribal services and who
would otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservation." Id. at 157.
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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exclusively regulating nonmember sportsmen because wildlife manage-
ment has some relation to reservation land. Moreover, nonmember sports-
men receive a modest amount of tribal services, like police protection,
because they are on the reservation longer than cigarette purchasers. The
state also would have a strong conservation interest in regulating wildlife
when animals migrate across state boundaries or when the state contributes
to the tribal program. Therefore, the Montana court properly emphasized
the state's conservation interest.48 These competing tribal and state in-
terests must be balanced in each case. The state most likely would prevail
when a conservation interest is present and when the tribe does not lose
a substantial amount of revenue through dual regulation.
In contrast to Colville, the Court, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,49 took a hostile approach toward claims for state regulation of
nonmembers on reservations. The Court held that Arizona was preempted
from imposing motor carrier license and fuel use taxes on a nonmember
timber contractor working on the reservation.5" It reached this decision
even though the state taxes would take only one percent of the contractor's
annual profit.5" In reaching this decision, the Court collapsed the preemp-
tion and tribal self-government tests to form a new preemption standard.52
The essence of the new preemption standard is that the competing
federal, state, and tribal interests are balanced in order to determine
whether a state could regulate nonmembers on reservations.53 In exam-
ining federal enactments, the Court stated that it did not require an express
congressional intent to preempt. Rather, preemption can be found with
an ambiguous federal statute based on the federal policy of encouraging
tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency.54 Furthermore, in
assessing the tribe's interest, the Court will consider the "geographical
component to tribal sovereignty," which is "highly relevant" to the
preemption inquiry.55 The Court also stated that any economic burden to
the tribe is a relevant factor.56
Applying the preemption standard to the Arizona taxes, the Bracker
48. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
49. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
50. Id. at 138.
51. This finding of the effect on the contractor's profit was made by the dissent. Id. at 158-59
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. The Court asserted that the interference with tribal self-government test is an independent
barrier to state regulation. Id. at 142-43. What the Court actually did, however, was to merge the
two tests into its preemption analysis. See also infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
53. The Bracker court stated, "This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute concep-
tions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake .. " 448 U.S. at 145.
54. Id. at 143-44. See also supra note 36.
55. Id. at 151.
56. Id.
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Court found the federal regulatory scheme over harvesting Indian timber
so pervasive that Arizona was preempted from imposing any taxes.57 The
Bureau of Indian Affairs regulated on a daily basis almost all phases of
the production and marketing of Indian timber.58 Moreover, the Court
held the state taxes would thwart the federal objective of giving the tribes
all of the profit from their foresting activities.59 Turning to the state
interests, the Court apparently applied the Colville test to find that the
Arizona taxes would not be returned to the contractor in services. This
finding was based on the fact that all of the taxpayer's business is on the
reservation and the reservation roads are owned by the tribe and the
federal government.' In addition, the Court held the state could not show
how the taxpayer's on-reservation activities affected the state off the
reservation. 6 Although Arizona possessed a recognizable interest in ob-
taining revenue, the Court ruled this interest insufficient to justify the
taxing scheme.62
Bracker suggests, contrary to Colville, that state restrictions on a tribe's
regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers rarely would be valid
because tribal and federal interests almost always outweigh the competing
state interests. Any federal statute or activity arguably supporting tribal
wildlife programs would be given great weight because of the federal
policy of furthering the tribe's economic independence. Therefore, under
Bracker, the Eastern Band court properly emphasized federal agency
involvement in the tribe's program,63 while the Montana court erred in
looking for an express statement of Congress to authorize preemption.'
Moreover, Bracker suggests that the tribe has a strong interest in exclusive
regulation because the sportsmen programs take place on tribal lands and
state regulation usually would affect tribal income. Consequently, a state
would prevail only if it could show an overwhelming conservation in-
terest, like protecting a scarce resource necessary for human survival.65
Colville and Bracker present different views on how to evaluate state
claims to regulate nonmembers on reservation land. Not surprisingly, the
two subsequent courts deciding the hunting and fishing concurrent reg-
ulation issue chose to take different approaches.
57. See also Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (finding
federal Indian trader statutes so comprehensive that they preempt the imposition of a state transaction
privilege tax on the sale of farm machinery to an Indian tribe).
58. 448 U.S. at 147.
59. 448 U.S. at 149. The court stated, "The taxes would threaten the overriding federal objective
of guaranteeing Indians that they will 'receive . . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is
capable of yielding .. '" 448 U.S. at 149 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
60. 448 U.S. at 150.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
65. See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
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IV. THE CIRCUITS FOLLOW THE SUPREME COURT'S SPLIT: WHITE
MOUNTAIN AND MESCALERO I
Shortly after the Supreme Court announced the two landmark dual
regulation decisions, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits rendered incompatible
opinions on the same issue. The Ninth Circuit followed the approach of
Colville, while the Tenth Circuit paralleled the Bracker analysis. These
differing opinions need to be scrutinized, not only because they are the
most comprehensive lower court statements on the issue of state regulation
of nonmember hunting and fishing on reservations, but also because the
Tenth Circuit's opinion was appealed twice to the Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of state regulation of non-
member sportsmen on reservation land in White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Arizona.66 The court held that Washington and Arizona could not impose
state licensing requirements and more restrictive bag limits and hunting
seasons on nonmember hunting and fishing on the Colville and Apache
reservations." In reaching this conclusion, however, the court utilized
the Colville approach.
Like the Colville court, the White Mountain court first conducted a
separate preemption inquiry. The court found no federal statute specifi-
cally relating to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation land.68
The court further held that Public Law 280, which gave certain states
limited civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations, gave Washington
the power to regulate nonmembers on reservation land.69 Additionally,
the court held that although Arizona did not have any power under Public
Law 280, it retained its regulatory authority over the reservation by the
Arizona Enabling Act.7" The court supported this contention by referring
to the Colville proposition that the state Enabling Act allows state regu-
lation of reservation activity involving nonmembers, even though that
activity concerns reservation realty."1 The court then noted that the federal
policies of encouraging tribal political and economic independence were
given little weight in Colville.7 2 Similarly, the court did not place much
66. 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cit. 1981).
67. The court affirmed a preliminary injunction against Washington, and vacated the denial of
the Apache's summary judgment action against Arizona, remanding the case for further findings.
Id. at 1285-86.
68. Id. at 1279-80.
69. Id. at 1279.
70. Id. at 1279-80. The Enabling Act provides Arizona shall: "[F]orever disclaim all right and
title to ... all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the
right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior
sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinquished the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States." 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910).
71. White Mountain, 649 F.2d at 1280.
72. Id.
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emphasis on those federal policies.73 Finally, the court concluded, as had
the Colville court, that the authority by which tribes are empowered to
adopt ordinances concerning reservation activity, delegated to the tribes
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, does not manifest a congres-
sional intent to preempt state regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing
on the reservation.74 The court ignored the significance of the federal
government's assistance given to the tribe in developing wildlife pro-
grams.
Finding no preemption, the court engaged in the second test outlined
in Colville: balancing the tribal and state interests in dual regulation.76
The court briefly noted the tribe has an interest in political and economic
independence, and the tribe historically has exercised control over its
wildlife resources.77 Nevertheless, the court cited Colville for the principle
that nondiscriminatory state taxes on nonmembers on reservations are
valid, even if they impair valuable tribal revenue.78 The court cautioned,
however, that the tribal revenue interest is entitled to some weight be-
cause, unlike Colville, the value of the sportsmen program is generated
from reservation land.79 With this holding, the Ninth Circuit in White
Mountain shifted from the position it took in Montana that the economic
effect upon the tribe of state regulation on nonmembers is irrelevant.8"
Moving to the state's interests, the White Mountain court applied the
Colville test to hold that the state's conservation interest becomes "quite
powerful" when fish and game migrate across reservation boundaries."
Additionally, the court found the state's revenue interest can best be
supported by showing that state game migrates onto the reservation or
that the state performs fish and game services for the tribe.82 The court
held against state regulation only because the states showed no conser-
vation interest or services performed for the tribe, while the tribe proved
it would lose revenue through state regulation.83 Yet, the tone of the
opinion favors state regulation in many cases because the court takes a
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1281.
75. This analysis is in stark contrast to the emphasis the Fourth Circuit gave this factor. See supra
notes 20-24 and accompanying text. See also infra note 87 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
77. White Mountain, 649 F.2d at 1281.
78. Id. at 1282.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
81. The court noted, "States have an obvious interest in conserving animals which, if protected,
would move off reservations onto state lands; moreover, states have an interest in animals that migrate
from state lands, where they survive by virtue of the states' conservation efforts, onto reservations."
649 F.2d at 1283.
82. Id. at 1283-84 n.10.
83. Id at 1283, 1285-86.
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strict view of federal preemption. Moreover, if federal preemption is not
found, the federal interests are ignored and state and tribal revenue in-
terests are balanced according to the Colville formula.
In contrast to White Mountain, the Tenth Circuit, in Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. New Mexico (Mescalero I),84 took the more restrictive approach
toward state regulation outlined in Bracker. The court invalidated New
Mexico's asserted right to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on
the Mescalero reservation by balancing the federal, tribal, and state in-
terests.
The Mescalero I court found the federal government has a tremendous
interest in excluding state regulation. The Apache treaty was interpreted
to give the tribe substantial power over wildlife resources.85 Moreover,
the tribal constitution, which was adopted pursuant to the delegated au-
thority of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, provided for the tribe's
control of wildlife resources.86 The court next referred to the extensive
federal participation in developing and maintaining the tribal programs.87
Finally, the court held that although New Mexico is not a state with
reservation regulatory authority under Public Law 280, even if the state
had such power, Public Law 280 specifically excludes states from ex-
ercising authority over tribal regulation of tribal wildlife resources.88
In assessing the tribal interests, the Mescalero I court gave an elaborate
exposition of the "significant interest" tribes have in preserving their
historic power over wildlife management.89 The court also noted that the
federal policy of encouraging tribal economic self-sufficiency is a factor
to be considered. 9' Finally, the court explained that this case is different
from Colville because the Mescalero\ tribe generated the value of its
program from the reservation. 9'
The Mescalero I court finally found the state had no interest in pre-
serving wildlife within reservation borders because the tribe was handling
wildlife management successfully.9 2 The state also did not contribute to
84. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir.
1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
85. Id. at 731.
86. Id. This constitution gives the tribe the power "[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife
and natural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of trade and the use and disposition
of tribal property upon the reservation .... "Mescalero Apache Tribe Revised Const. art. I 1, § 1 (c).
87. 630 F.2d at 732. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
88. Id. The Mescalero I court noted that Public Law 280 protects Indian tribes against deprivation
of "any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect
to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or regulating thereof." Id. \(quoting 25
U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1976)).
89. 630 F.2d at 728-30.
90. Id. at 734.
91. Id. at 730.
92. Id. at 734-35.
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the tribal program.93 Therefore, the state possessed an insufficient interest
in regulating tribal fish and game programs.
94
There are numerous differences between the approaches taken by the
White Mountain and Mescalero I courts. Most importantly, the White
Mountain court applied the Colville directive that preemption and frus-
tration of tribal self-government are separate inquiries. The effect of the
White Mountain approach is that if no clear congressional statement in-
dicates Congress intended to preempt state regulation, the court will not
consider the federal interests and will balance only the state and tribal
interests. In contrast, the Mescalero I court still considers the federal
interests relevant in balancing the federal, tribal, and state interests. This
difference explains why Mescalero I, in contrast to White Mountain,
treated the delegated authority to the tribes under the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934 as relevant. The Mescalero I court also deemed any
federal assistance pertinent because it demonstrates a federal interest,
even though Congress may have made no express declaration that the
assistance was meant to exclude state regulation.
Another major discrepancy between the approaches of White Mountain
and Mescalero I is the courts' treatment of tribal interests. The White
Mountain court strictly adhered to the Colville standard of linking any
tribal revenue interest to the land and the services afforded to nonmem-
bers. On the other hand, the Mescalero I court, like Bracker, stated that
the tribe has a revenue interest because the activity occurs on reservation
territory and furthers the goal of economic independence, even though
the Mescalero I court later applied the Colville test.
The contrasting approaches taken by these two courts echo differences
within the Supreme Court. These differences were carried over in the
Supreme Court's next two decisions involving tribal authority over non-
members.
V. A DIVIDED SUPREME COURT SPEAKS AGAIN AND THE CIRCUITS
RESPOND IN DISARRAY
In the 1981 term, the Supreme Court twice had the opportunity to
explain its position on the nature of the tribe's authority to regulate
93. Id. at 733.
94. In this case, the state only claimed two interests to justify dual regulation: 1) the need to
maintain wildlife resources at a state-defined ecologically optimum level; and 2),the need for the
state to assert criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers on the reservation, because the Supreme Court
held that tribes lacked this power in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The
court ruled that the tribe's civil authority over nonmembers, however, coupled with the criminal
authority afforded tribes under a federal trespass statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976), was sufficient
to enforce tribal laws. 630 F.2d at 736. The Supreme Court agreed that two federal trespass statutes,
18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1981), gave the tribe sufficient enforcement
power. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2391 n.27 (1983).
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nonmember activity on reservation land. The decisions were markedly
different. In fact, after the Eighth Circuit responded to the Court's ap-
parent message in Montana v. United States,95 the Court changed its
message. This change allowed the Tenth Circuit to reach a result different
from the Eighth Circuit.
In Montana v. United States, the Court held that Montana had exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on Crow reser-
vation land owned in fee by nonmembers.96 This conclusion was reached
in part on the finding that state regulation did not interfere with tribal
sovereignty. The Court reasoned that tribal power exists only to protect
self-government or control internal regulations.97 This power normally
does not "extend to the activities of nonmembers," 98 unless those non-
members enter into consensual relations with the tribe or nonmember
activities directly affect the political integrity, economic security, or health
and welfare of the tribe." This rationale is based largely on the fact that
these nonmembers do not participate in tribal government. "
The Montana v. United States holding that the state can exclusively
regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on nonmember-owned res-
ervation land has been enforced by lower courts. 0 In addition, the mes-
sage conveyed by the Court to lower courts on the dual regulation issue
was that although the tribe could regulate nonmember sportsmen, because
these visitors entered into consensual relations with the tribe, tribes could
not exclusively regulate these nonmember state citizens. Therefore, in
White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander,02 the district court
of Minnesota held that state efforts to regulate nonmember hunting, fish-
ing, and wild rice gathering were not preempted and the state did not
interfere with tribal self-government. In its preemption analysis, the White
Earth court noted the band's historic interest in regulating wildlife, the
federal assistance to the band's wildlife management program, and federal
statutes evincing a policy of encouraging tribal economic self-suffi-
ciency. "3 Yet, the court failed to hold the state was preempted from
95. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
96. Justice Stewart wrote for a majority of six. Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented on
the grounds that the tribe owned the land in question.
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id. at 565.
99. Id. at 565-66.
100. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172-73 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 540 F. Supp. 276 (D.S.D. 1982);
Wisconsin v. Baker, 524 F. Supp. 726 (W.D.Wis. 1981); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072 (D.Utah 1981); White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 527 (D.Minn.
1981), affd, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 489 (1982).
102. 518 F. Supp. 527 (D.Minn. 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 489 (1982).
103. Id. at 536.
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regulating because no federal statute provided any "direct evidence of a
federal intent to preempt.""0 Moreover, the state had a strong interest in
preventing the tribe from disrupting the state's wildlife management ef-
forts through more permissive bag limits and sporting seasons because
the small amount of tribal land' °5 is scattered within a much larger state
conservation area. "
The White Earth court also found tribal self-government would not be
obstructed because there was no evidence the band would suffer econom-
ically from requiring nonmembers to purchase state licenses before en-
gaging in reservation sporting activities. The reason is twofold: nonmember
sportsmen might buy tribal permits while on state land to ensure against
mistakenly being on tribal land, and nonmember tribal patrons probably
already have purchased a state license because of the extensive resources
in Minnesota. o7
The Eighth Circuit affirmed White Earth on appeal.' 08 Although the
court of appeals acknowledged the Bracker principle that an express
congressional statement is not necessary to preempt state action in Indian
cases, the court affirmed the district court's opinion.' ° The court re-
sponded that there is no federal statute preempting the state, the state had
a strong historic interest in wildlife management, and there is no showing
the tribe would lose revenue by state regulation."'
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, "' the Court altered the message
given in Montana v. United States"2 The Court held that the tribe had
the authority to impose a severance tax on oil and gas removed from
reservation land by nonmembers after the nonmembers had entered into
a lease agreement with the tribe. The Court reasoned that the tribe had
the right to "control economic activity within its jurisdiction and defray
the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions
104. Id.
105. The amount of reservation land owned by nonmembers was 653,500 of 709,500 acres (92%).
Id. at 534.
106. Id. at 537.
107. Id.
108. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 489 (1982).
109. Id. at 1137-38.
110. Id.
111. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
112. Justice Marshall, the author of the Bracker opinion, wrote for a majority of six. Stevens,
Burger, and Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that once an agreement is reached allowing non-
members to enter reservation land, the tribe cannot unilaterally impose extra conditions upon that
entry. This author believes the differences between the Montana v. United States and Merrion
opinions, like the difference between the Colville and Bracker opinions, see supra note 52, is due
to the particular faction of the court that is writing the majority opinion. This conclusion is supported
by observing that the dissenters in Merrion were in the majority in Montana v. United States, and
the dissenters in Montana v. United States were in the majority in Merrion. See supra note 96.
[Vol. 14
Spring 1984] HUNTING AND FISHING ON RESERVATION LAND
from persons . . . engaged in economic activities" on the reservation. 113
This view of tribal power differs from Montana v. United States, as the
dissent noted, because the Court treated the nonmember as a quasi-tribal
citizen, even though the nonmember did not participate in tribal govern-
ment. "4
The Merrion message was received by the Tenth Circuit whose Mes-
calero I decision was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Montana
v. United States"5 The Tenth Circuit, in a terse opinion (Mescalero Il) 116
first maintained that Merrion, rather than Montana v. United States, should
be the controlling precedent because Merrion concerned the power of a
tribe to "regulate tribal resources on tribal land.""'7 The Mescalero II
court held that the Mescalero Apache tribe has the power to exclusively
regulate nonmember sportsmen on reservation land because the tribe,
without New Mexico's assistance, has managed tribal resources for eco-
nomic return." 8
The Supreme Court quickly granted review of Mescalero H."9 The
next section of this article discusses the Court's decision, reconciles the
conflicting Supreme Court and lower court decisions, and provides the
practitioner with a comprehensive standard of analysis.
VI. MESCALERO III AND A PROPOSED STANDARD OF ANALYSIS
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe (Mescalero III),"' the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding that New Mexico was
preempted from restricting the Mescalero Apache tribe's regulation of
nonmember hunting and fishing on reservation land. The decision was
unanimous, thus raising the possibility that the Court had reconciled its
dispute over whether to apply the Colville or the Bracker standard in dual
regulation cases.
In Mescalero III, the Court employed the Bracker preemption test of
probing the competing federal, tribal, and state interests at stake in state
regulation."'2 Even though the Court now seemingly agreed on this mod-
113. 455 U.S. at 137.
114. Id. at 171-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
116. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct.
2378 (1983).
117. Id. at 57.
118. Id. at 56-57.
119. 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
120. 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
121. The Court maintained, in a footnote, that it was still treating the interference with tribal
self-government test as an independent test. Id. at 2386 n. 16.
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ified preemption standard,' 22 the Court is divided on the emphasis that
should be given to the federal policies of encouraging tribal political and
economic independence and preserving traditional tribal authority when
a federal enactment is ambiguous.'23 A majority of the Court probably
would not find preemption based solely on a modest amount of federal
assistance coupled with the federal policy of encouraging Indian auton-
omy. The Eighth Circuit in White Earth reached precisely that conclu-
sion.'24 If the Court were presented with a federal statute which arguably
gives tribes the exclusive authority over its wildlife resources, however,
this statute, along with the general federal policies of encouraging tribal
independence, would provide compelling evidence of a federal interest
for preempting state regulation. The Court in Mescalero III suggested,
in a footnote, that Public Law 280 might be that statute.' 25 Yet, the Court
relied on it as a secondary point to its main argument concerning federal
agency activity. ,'
The Court's major contention that the federal government opposes state
regulation rested on massive f6deral agency efforts to create and manage
the Mescalero tribe's commercial wildlife programs.' 27 Federal agencies
financed the tribal program, donated elk to build a herd, regularly stocked
the streams, and assisted in writing the bag limit ordinances to ensure
maximum herd population. 28 Although this degree of federal assistance
is not alone sufficient to preempt state regulation, because it does not
122. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3402
(1982); see generally Note, The Developing Test for State Regulator, Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 Or. L. Rev. 561, 574-78 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291, 3295 (1983), where the court stated. "We have
... employed a preemption analysis that is informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty,
rather than determined by them"; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M.,
102 S. Ct. 3394, 3404 (1982), where Justice Rehnquist stated in a dissenting opinion, "1 believe
the dominant trend of our cases is towards treating the scope of reservation immunity from nondis-
criminatory state taxation as a question of preemption, ultimately dependent on congressional intent.
In such a framework, the tradition of Indian sovereignty stands as an independent barrier to dis-
criminatory taxes, and otherwise serves only as a guide to the ascertainment of the congressional
will."
124. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
125. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. at 2389-90 n.25 (1983). The Court
quoted the provision in the statute which arguably excludes states from exercising authority over
reservation hunting and fishing. See supra note 88.
126. The provision of Public Law 280 prohibiting state regulation of hunting and fishing on
reservations only applies to a handful of states who were forbidden to regulate prior to the 1953
adoption of the statute. Whether a state had the right to regulate before 1953 remains the central
issue. Public Law 280 becomes irrelevant when the bulk of the analysis is focused on this question.
See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1279 n.4, in which the court
stated, "[U]nder Public Law 280, States retain the civil regulatory jurisdiction over the on-reservation
activities of non-Indians that they enjoyed prior to the Law"; Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,
369 U.S. 45, 47 (1962), which found the purpose of this provision was "to preserve federally
granted fishing rights," not to create new rights.
127. Both the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries
and Wildlife participated in the Mescalero programs. 103 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
128. Id. at 2382-83.
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reach the daily regulation the BIA exercised in Bracker, '29 such assistance
should never be ignored as it was in White Mountain.'30 Yet, whether a
state can restrict a tribe's nonmember hunting and fishing regulations
almost always will depend on the strength of the competing tribal and
state interests. This conclusion is based on the observation that the weight
of the federal interest only rests on the degree of federal agency involve-
ment, which is rarely at the level of Mescalero III.
The Court referred to three tribal interests. First, it noted, as did the
Tenth Circuit in Mescalero 1,131 the tribe's historic interest in wildlife
management, which is confirmed by a treaty and federal trespass stat-
utes. '3 Although this interest is legitimate, it should be afforded much
less significance because the fish and game management programs are
for commercial sporting purposes and few tribes historically have engaged
in these commercial ventures.
Second, the Court explained that the state's more restrictive bag limits
and hunting seasons would interfere with the tribe's carefully planned
management program to curb excessive population growth.'3 3 Although
the Court's observation is insightful, many tribal programs are not as
carefully conceived as the Court suggests. Therefore, tribal management
has little applicability to most other cases.
Ultimately, the Court relied on the Colville test'34 for determining when
a loss in tribal revenue becomes important in the preemption analysis of
dual regulation cases. The Court reasoned that the revenue interest is
strong because the value of the tribal wildlife program is generated by
Indian labor and land.' 35 The counter argument still stands that, in many
cases like White Earth, the additional state license fee would not impair
tribal revenue because many nonmembers already own a state license
before going onto the reservation. '3 6
The Court's reliance on the Colville test is especially appropriate be-
cause the test measures the practical impact of state regulation on tribal
and state interests. '3 7 The polar views on tribal sovereignty contained in
Montana v. United States 3 ' and Merrion"'3 are best reconciled by applying
129. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
132. 103 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
133. Id. at 2388-89.
134. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
135. 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2390.
136. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (holding in part that the
Montana coal severance tax was not invalid under the commerce clause because the state can
reasonably expect to be compensated for the cost of providing governmental services when the
activity taxed is connected to interstate commerce).
138. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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the Colville test. Those contrasting positions are based on abstract notions
of citizenship and territoriality, rather than the practical effect of state
regulation. Indeed, applying the Colville test to those two contrasting
cases would lead to the same result: in Montana v. United States, the
nonmember sportsmen received no tribal services or anything of value
from reservation land; and, in Merrion, the nonmember was taxed on the
reservation's resources, and received tribal services like police protec-
tion. "4
After balancing the federal and tribal interests against the state interests,
the Court found the asserted state interests insufficient to justify New
Mexico's proposed regulations for the following reasons. First, the state
had no conservation interest because fish and game, for the most part,
were not migratory, and the few that did migrate off the reservation were
not a scarce state resource. 4' Second, the state contributed no assistance
to the tribe. 142 Third, the state performed no services for the nonmembers
which would be paid for by the state license fee. 143 Fourth, a naked
revenue interest was deemed inadequate by the Court to justify state
regulation.'" Nevertheless, as the cases in the previous sections dem-
onstrate, there dire numerous situations where the state has a compelling
interest in regulation. One strong state interest exists when scarce mi-
gratory game pass over reservation borders, as was emphasized by the
Ninth Circuit in Montana'45 and White Mountain. '46 The state has a further
legitimate interest when the tribe receives state assistance. Additionally,
there are situations when more permissive tribal bag limits and sporting
seasons will interfere with a carefully managed state program, as the
White Earth court demonstrated. "' Indeed, the Court left the door open
to these cases by stating that "[a] State's regulatory interest will be
particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that
necessitate State intervention."'
1 48
In summary, to determine whether a particular reservation can be sub-
ject to state restrictions on nonmember sporting activities, practitioners
can use a three-step balancing test. First, look at the degree of federal
involvement in the tribe's program. Second, evalulate the extent state
140. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982). The court noted, "They
benefit from the provision of police protection and other governmental services, as well as from 'the
advantages of a civilized society' that are assured by the existence of a tribal government." Id.
141. Mescalero 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2390.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2391.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 106, 110 and accompanying texts.
148. 103 S. Ct. at 2387.
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regulation will detrimentally affect tribal revenue. Third, assess the grav-
ity of the state's conservation interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court held
that New Mexico could not regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on
the Mescalero Apache reservation. This decision was based upon a bal-
ancing of the competing federal, tribal, and state interests at stake in state
regulation. The facts in this case weighed strongly in favor of invalidation
of state regulation.
This article suggests there are other situations in which state regulation
would be constitutional. There are few firm guidelines for future cases,
although this article has attempted to set forth the factors most likely to
influence courts. These critical factors include: the extent of federal and/or
state agency support of the tribe's program; whether the tribe's revenue
from sportsmen license fees and nonmember purchases of Indian-owned
shops would be significantly reduced by dual regulation; whether state
regulation interferes with the conservation management plans of the tribe;
and, whether the state has a strong interest in conserving scarce migratory
animals.
